Burjeel Holdings PLC
Fundamental — what it's worthbottom-up fair value
Built from a free-cash-flow DCF on a measured cost of equity, normalized earnings power, one earnings multiple (with a 100% payout, P/E and dividend yield are the same number) and a dividend-discount floor — what is it worth?
Is it cheap or expensive right now?
Latest price vs our fair value. A comparison, not a recommendation.
What it's worth — four lenses
Four independent valuation methods, blended into one weighted central fair value.
| Valuation lens | Per share (AED) | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| FCFF DCF — primary | 2.64 | 35% |
| Relative EV/EBITDA | 1.89 | 25% |
| Normalized earnings | 1.49 | 25% |
| Dividend discount (policy lens) | 0.56 | 15% |
| Weighted central fair value | 1.85 | +67% vs spot |
The four lenses span AED 0.56 (the dividend a holder actually receives after the FY2025 cut, the cautious read) to AED 2.64 (the FCFF DCF, a statement about a margin recovery to below the company’s own 2023 level — 83% of that value is terminal value, disclosed). Relative multiples and normalized earnings sit in between. The swing factor is whether the receivables cycle turns and the Pillar-Two tax path holds — not the headline tax rate. Full detail is in the study and the open model.
Technical & price structuretrend, momentum, key levels
Trend, momentum and key levels — what is the price doing now?
What the chart says
In plain terms: Burjeel trades at AED 1.11 — just below our weighted bear case of 1.14, and far under the weighted central fair value of 1.85. That geometry is the whole story: the market is pricing a scenario where the margin never leaves the high-teens, a full 15% minimum tax applies with no substance relief, receivables stay stuck at 135 days, Saudi stays a rounding error, and a management team that guided a 23.5% margin and delivered 18.1% is extended no credit — and then discounts a little further. Two things push the other way. First, the tax: the UAE’s 15% top-up applies only to income above a substance-based carve-out (payroll + tangible assets), and Burjeel’s own FY2025 filing shows a 7.0% effective rate — a mechanics-driven path toward 10–13%, not the flat 15% the market seems to assume. Second, the cash: FY2025 absorbed AED 649mn of operating surplus into working capital before it ever reached the cash-flow statement, which is why the 7.00% five-year sukuk priced where it did and why the dividend was cut. Both are real risks, not sourcing errors — the receivables clock has to turn for the DCF case to matter at all. What moves the price near-term is the FY2025 DMTT return (filed 2026–27, the single document that reweights every lens at once) and the H1-2026 results, due mid-August, the first full read on whether the margin recovery and the receivables cycle are turning.
Key levels
Volatility & where the case breaks
| Typical daily moveRoughly how far the price swings in an average day (based on a measure called ATR). Bigger means choppier. | ~2.3% |
Monte Carlo — where could the price go?near-term price paths
50,000 simulated futures — near-term price paths, independent of the fundamental value.
The 5th–95th and 25th–75th percentile bands from the 50,000-path simulation. Static and pre-computed — independent of the fundamental levers above.
The exact percentiles
The 5th / 25th / middle / 75th / 95th outcomesLine up all 50,000 outcomes low to high — these are the values at the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95% marks., from 50,000 paths.
| Timeframe | Rare low (5%) | 25% | Middle | 75% | Rare high (95%) |
|---|
What drives the odds
50,000 paths, carry-anchored to the UAE production panel: the Pillar-Two tax path (10→13% mechanics vs a flat-15% assessment), the pace at which DSO normalizes off 135 days, the margin mix between fast-growing oncology and the group’s surgical base, the 7.00% sukuk’s funding-cost read-through, and the FY2025 DMTT return itself (filed 2026–27) which can reweight every lens at once. Genuinely thin float (~11%, some undisclosed buyback execution) keeps idiosyncratic volatility high relative to the panel. Details in the methodology.
Peer set & risks
Where Burjeel sits against verified GCC hospital peers
Listed GCC hospital operators trade in tiers, and verified, dated marks explain the gap better than adjectives: Al Habib runs a ~26% margin and is paid 24–34× EV/EBITDA for it; Middle East Healthcare, the cheapest verifiable comp at a low-teens margin, trades ~13×. Burjeel earns 18.5% with a 135-day receivables cycle and a genuinely thin float, and trades near 8.4× — below every verified peer. This is a competitive map, not a price table.
| Name | EV/EBITDA | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Burjeel — spot | ~8.4× | the discount this study prices |
| Dr. Sulaiman Al Habib | ~24–34× | ~26% margin, ~33% ROE, deep float |
| Dallah Healthcare | ~22–26× | Riyadh expansion cycle |
| Mouwasat | ~18–19× | Eastern-Province leader, 30%+ margin |
| Al Hammadi Holding | ~17.5× | Riyadh capacity build |
| Middle East Healthcare | ~13× | the verifiable floor — our 11.5× base discounts from here |
| Net debt / EBITDA | n/d — see study | sukuk-funded, 7.00% marginal cost |
The debate is not whether Burjeel is a good business — it runs a genuine multi-country hospital network at an 18.5% EBITDA margin. It is what that business is worth once you notice two things. First, the receivables clock: FY2025 absorbed AED 649mn of operating surplus before it reached cash, and DSO sits at 135 days. Second, the tax base: the market appears to price a flat 15% minimum, while the mechanics — and Burjeel’s own 7.0% FY2025 effective rate — point to a 10→13% path. Competitive map, not advice.
About this series & how we build these
Want the full study and the spreadsheet?
Full write-up plus the editable Excel model.
Found a flaw? Attack the model
The full study (PDF) and Excel model are available on a computer.
Edition: 12 Jul 2026 (rev. 2). Older editions stay in the Library.