Elm Company
Fundamental — what it's worthbottom-up fair value
Built up from a discounted cash flow, forward multiples, and an earnings-power cross-check — what is it worth?
Is it cheap or expensive right now?
Latest price vs our fair value. A comparison, not a recommendation.
What it's worth — five lenses
Five independent valuation methods, blended into one weighted central fair value.
| Valuation lens | Per share (SAR) | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Discounted cash flow — primary (β 1.0, WACC 10.5%, g 4%) | 576 | 40% |
| Forward P/E (24× 2025e EPS) | 686 | 30% |
| EV/EBITDA (18–20× 2025e) | 625 | 25% |
| Monte Carlo 3-month median (cross-check) | 664 | — |
| Weighted central fair value | 620 | −5.8% vs spot |
The lenses span SAR 530 (a high-beta post-crash re-rate) to SAR 720 (a low-beta government-defensive read) — the full football field is in the study. The whole gap is a discount-rate argument: 77% of DCF value is terminal, so whether the market prices Elm at a neutral beta or re-rates it up or down is the crux; registry-exclusivity durability behind the ~46%-margin Digital Business is the second swing factor. Full detail is in the study and the open model.
Technical & price structuretrend, momentum, key levels
Trend, momentum and key levels — what is the price doing now?
What the chart says
In plain terms: Elm Company has crashed ~49% from its January-2025 peak (SAR 1,289, P/E ~56×) to SAR 658.5 (P/E ~24×) — the de-rate has done most of the work of correcting the euphoria, and the shares now trade close to, and slightly above, our weighted central fair value of SAR 620. On a neutral-beta discounted-cash-flow (β 1.0, WACC 10.5%) the business is worth about SAR 576; crediting the ~88% return on invested capital and ~70% recurring revenue, the multiple-based lenses land at SAR 590–690. The whole gap is a discount-rate argument, because ~77% of DCF value is terminal: if the market prices Elm as the low-beta government compounder it has historically been (β ~0.7), fair value is closer to SAR 750; if it re-rates Elm as a high-beta growth name after the crash (β ~1.6), fair value falls toward SAR 400. Elm’s moat is exclusive access to Saudi Arabia’s national data registry behind its highest-margin Digital Business line (73.8% of 2024 revenue); any erosion of that exclusivity is the other swing factor. What moves it near-term is the market’s view of Elm’s risk and any registry-access news — there is no dividend cushion worth mentioning (yield ~1.3%) while the argument resolves.
Key levels
Volatility & where the case breaks
| Typical daily moveRoughly how far the price swings in an average day (based on a measure called ATR). Bigger means choppier. | ~2.1% |
Monte Carlo — where could the price go?near-term price paths
50,000 simulated futures — near-term price paths, independent of the fundamental value.
The 5th–95th and 25th–75th percentile bands from the 50,000-path simulation. Static and pre-computed — independent of the fundamental levers above.
The exact percentiles
The exact percentiles
The 5th / 25th / middle / 75th / 95th outcomesLine up all 50,000 outcomes low to high — these are the values at the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95% marks., from 50,000 paths.
| Timeframe | Rare low (5%) | 25% | Middle | 75% | Rare high (95%) |
|---|
What drives the odds
50,000 paths on a Student-t engine fitted to Tadawul’s own volatility panel (not borrowed from another market): the discount-rate/beta re-rating (the crux), government digital-spend growth, broader Tadawul risk appetite, and idiosyncratic execution vol — plus event forces: a registry-exclusivity or margin shock, a platform-launch or contract-win surprise, a quarterly earnings surprise, and broader macro events. Drift is carry-anchored (risk-free minus dividend yield) with no directional signal layered on — Saudi names run carry-only until the Tadawul panel reaches ~5 names. Details in the methodology.
Peer set & risks
Where Elm Company sits in its markets
Elm has no clean listed peer on the Tadawul — the closest comparators are global IT-services/gov-tech names and regional digital-platform businesses, though none share Elm’s national-registry exclusivity. On recurring mix, ROIC and margin, Elm screens at or above the better global software-services franchises, which is the basis for its historical premium multiple. This is a competitive map, not a price table.
| Arena | Elm’s position | Main comparators |
|---|---|---|
| Forward P/E | ~24× (below own ~42× history) | Global IT services 18–28× · GCC platforms 20–35× |
| EV/EBITDA (forward) | ~20× | Global IT services 12–18× · GCC platforms 14–22× |
| Return on invested capital | ~88% | global software-services peers typically 20–40% |
| Recurring revenue | ~70% | comparable to subscription/platform peers |
| Balance sheet | net cash, no financial debt | sector typically modest net debt |
| Moat | exclusive national-registry access | peers compete on scale/switching costs, not exclusivity |
The debate is whether ~24× already pays fully for the crash, or whether an 88%-ROIC, registry-protected franchise justifies more once the discount-rate fog clears — which the DCF and relative lenses answer roughly yes, and the high-beta re-rate scenario answers more cautiously. Competitive map, not advice.
About this series & how we build these
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Full write-up plus the editable Excel model.
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The full study (PDF) and Excel model are available on a computer.
Edition: 10 Jul 2026. Older editions stay in the Library.